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On June 13, 1986, the legislature amended the South Caro-
lina Code to include provisions for the equitable apportionment
of marital property between spouses upon divorce.1 The task of
* In 1981 the South Carolina Law Review published an article on determining
property rights upon divorce in South Carolina: Chastain, Henry & Woodside,
Determination of Property Rights upon Divorce in South Carolina: An Exploration and
Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. REV. 227 (1981). Since that time, there has been substantial
development in the area of determination of property rights. It is not the purpose of this
undertaking to trace developments in the law since the prior article. For further
exploration of those developments, see R. CHASTAIN, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA. VOLUME I (S.C. Bar 1986 & Temp. Supp.). The ferment has led to
legislative activity and it is the authors' belief that it is now appropriate to reexamine
approaches to evaluating contributions to property accumulation.
** Associate Professor of Economics, University of South Carolina at Aiken. A.B.,
1972, College of William and Mary; Ph.D., 1980, University of North Carolina.
*** Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, A.B.,
1966, Princeton University; LL.B., 1970, Yale University; M.U.S., 1970, Yale University.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Supp. 1986). Under these statutes each
spouse has an ownership right to marital property, and this ownership right is subject to
apportionment by South Carolina family courts. See id. § 20-7-471.
The court must consider fourteen specific factors in apportioning marital property.
These are as follows:
(1) Duration of marriage and ages of partners;
(2) fault;
(3) value of marital property and contributions thereto by each spouse;
(4) income and earning potential;
(5) health;
(6) need of either spouse for education;
(7) nonmarital property;
(8) retirement benefits;
(9) whether a court has awarded either party alimony;
(10) treatment of the family home in view of child custody considerations;
(11) tax consequences;
(12) any existing support obligations of either spouse,
(13) debts; and
(14) child custody arrangements.
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equitable apportionment that these provisions assign the family
court is a difficult one.' In the authors' view, the appellate courts
have increased the difficulty of this task by defining "economic
contribution" and "marital property" in ways that are both con-
fusing and excessively narrow. Broader definitions of these terms
are necessary to achieve an equitable distribution of marital
property and would produce results consistent with those sug-
gested by the factors enumerated in the Article.
The heart of the problem is that courts have not included as
contributions those activities that build or maintain nontrans-
ferable (and thus nonmarketable) assets. Thus, courts generally
have not considered such nontransferable assets as marital prop-
erty.3 Although most productive activities create assets that
have a measurable dollar value, some do not. Consider, for ex-
ample, activities that increase the value of a person's future la-
bor, such as working toward a college or professional degree,
gaining work experience, building a professional reputation, and
increasing goodwill and client loyalty. These activities create ca-
reer assets, including college or professional degrees, profes-
See id. § 20-7-473(1)-(14).
The statute defines "marital property" as "all real and personal property which has
been acquired by the parties during the marriage and which is owned as of the date of
filing or commencement of litigation ... regardless of how legal title is held .... " Id. §
20-7-473. The statute also defines nonmarital property, which includes inheritances, gifts
from anyone other than the spouse, previously owned property, property acquired after
the marriage ends, property excluded by antenuptial agreement, and any increase in
value of nonmarital property (except when the other spouse contributes to that in-
crease). Id. § 20-7-473(1)-(5).
The court has the authority to use any credible evidence, including government data
and expert testimony, to value marital contributions and property. Id. § 20-7-474. The
court has the authority to take actions necessary to effect its orders, see id. §§ 20-7-475, -
476, and to "achieve equity between the parties," id. § 20-7-476.
2. South Carolina courts are not alone in this task. Although their laws differ in
some respects, at least 40 other jurisdictions can be considered equitable distribution
jurisdictions. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19
FAhi. L.Q. 331, 354-60 (1986). The remaining nine are community property jurisdictions,
which divide property acquired during a marriage according to various regimes, many of
which are very similar to the division approaches in equitable division states. Id. at 353-
56. Commentators have discussed this matter extensively. See, e.g., Freed & Walker,
supra, at 353-67.
3. See Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights upon Di-
vorce in South Carolina: An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. REv. 227
(1981). That article provides a comprehensive review of the treatment of contributions
and marital property in the South Carolina courts. The authors will discuss some
changes in South Carolina law that have occurred since the article's publication in 1981.
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sional licenses, work experience, employer or client loyalty and
goodwill, and profit-sharing and pension programs. 4 These assets
are the focus of current controversy in divorce settlements and
in the legal literature on divorce. Each of these assets, either
legally or factually, is nontransferable, but each has value to its
owner. If the asset has value, there should be some way of recog-
nizing that value in the context of marriage dissolution. The
literature recognizes this, but frequently gives superficial treat-
ment to the problem.6
The equitable apportionment statute does not state whether
courts should include career assets as marital property. The
statute, however, seems to include as marital property the par-
ticular "career asset" known as pension rights.7 Furthermore,
the court of appeals has recognized that there are problems with
4. Economists have long used the term "human capital" to refer to knowledge and
skills acquired through education, training, or on-the-job experience, which increase the
worker's productive capacity. Lenore Weitzman first used the term "career assets" to
refer to "tangible and intangible assets that are acquired as a part of either spouse's
career or career potential.., such as pension and retirement benefits, a license to prac-
tice a profession or trade, medical and hospital insurance, the goodwill of a business, and
entitlements to company goods and services" L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 110 (1985). Career assets, as she defines them, constitute either an increased
earnings capacity because of the accumulation of human capital or fringe benefits pro-
vided by employee or employer contributions.
5. This is true both in South Carolina and in other states. Media reports of this
controversy appear in Adler & Stadtman, Dividing Degrees, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1986, at
61; Chase, Single Trouble, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Winter, Divorcing
Couples Increasingly Squabble over the Allocation of Pension Benefits, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 26, 1985, at 33, col. 3.
6. For example, one author simply states as follows: "Although lawyers are ethically
precluded from selling their law practices, a professional practice, like any other busi-
ness, is eligible for equitable distribution in divorce proceedings in many states. The
question is how to appraise its value." Skoloff, The Value of a Law Practice in a Di-
vorce, 73 A.B.A. J., Mar. 15, 1987, at 38.
7. South Carolina courts have held under prior law that particular career assets do
not constitute marital property. As recently as June 30, 1986, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the husband's medical degree was not marital property subject to
equitable distribution. Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 173, 345 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1986). This
is consonant with the general approach to this issue around the country. But see O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1986). In Johnson v. John-
son, 288 S.C. 270, 275, 341 S.E.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals held that
"a spouse's non-contributory retirement account is not marital property subject to equi-
table distribution. . . . Furthermore, the court should not consider the value of either
party's retirement plan in dividing the marital estate." Id. (citations omitted). See gen-
erally R. CHASTAIN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA: VOLUME I 38-
40 (S.C. Bar Temp. Supp. 1986).
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a strict, formulaic approach. In Watson v. Watson" that court
affirmed in relevant part the family court judge's decision that
the expert valuation of the wife's homemaker direct and indirect
contributions (based essentially on the minimum hourly wage)
was not adequate. The court of appeals properly wrote:
The trial judge rejected the expert's valuation of her contribu-
tions, noting:
[T]he court is inclined to disagree with the minimum
wage value placed upon the [wife's] indirect contributions
under the facts of the case. Also, the number of hours at-
tibutable to each party for having [sic] and rearing the
children cannot be measured to a mathematical certainty.
The support of the wife during the marriage when the
[husband] was drinking, gambling, having periods of de-
pression and threatening suicide cannot be valued in
hours. Her concern for his drinking problem and instiga-
tion of the planned intervention by herself and Dr. Wat-
son's friends to cause [him] to stop drinking cannot be
valued quantitatively to a mathematical certainty. This
was a marriage of some twenty-three years and ends with
the wife being denied alimony or support. This is a mar-
riage where the husband's ability to earn is vastly supe-
rior to that of the wife, and the longer the parties are
married, the smaller the wife's percentage of direct mone-
tary contributions would be.
The wife's expert testified that it was difficult to place a
value on a spouse's indirect contributions to a mathematical
certainty. He did not value the wife's contributions. A family
court judge has wide discretion to distribute marital property
in any equitable manner. His judgment will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. However, "[t]he amount of prop-
erty awarded to the wife should bear a reasonable relationship
to her contributions toward the acquisition of the property or
the financial and material success of the family."9
The problem was a simple one: in light of the expeit testi-
mony, it did not seem fair to the family court judge, or to the
judges on the court of appeals, to distribute the property in the
manner dictated by the conventional formulas. Under the tradi-
8. 291 S.C. 13, 351 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1986).
9. Id. at 19-20, 351 S.E.2d at 887-88 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 38
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tional approaches, the best the wife's attorney could do was to
find an expert who would agree that the property distribution
was not fair and who would not put a dollar figure on the wife's
contribution, in hopes that the family court judge would be sym-
pathetic and give her a more substantial distribution based on
subjective factors. Ms. Watson's success both at trial and on ap-
peal suggests that the court of appeals and the family court are
willing to use subjective factors in achieving equitable divisions
of marital property. The authors believe they can show that the
Watson court's approach was wise and correct under objective
criteria, which that court did not articulate. Courts can use these
objective criteria to achieve a greater predictability in the law in
this area. In brief, the courts in Watson were attempting to give
weight to the effect that numerous nonmarket activities and as-
sets have on a long-term marriage. Although the experts had not
expressly factored in these activities and assets, they must have
had some part in the court's decisions.
The authors intend to show how one can value these
nonmarketable activities and assets and include them within the
relative contributions framework. The authors will also explain
why this must be done if the goal of the judicial system and our
society is equitable apportionment. We will demonstrate the use
of this framework in complicated and controversial marital cir-
cumstances, showing how it takes into account the specific fac-
tors listed in the equitable apportionment statute.'0 In particu-
lar, the authors will demonstrate the appropriate way to handle
marriages in which one spouse supports another while the latter
goes through college or professional training and long-term mar-
riages involving more traditional spousal roles."
II. CAREER ASSETS: A MAJOR CAUSE OF INEQUITABLE
SETTLEMENTS
When a husband and wife assume the traditional male and
female roles in a marriage, the husband builds both transferable
and nontransferable assets during the marriage. His salary helps
to buy tangible assets, such as cars and refrigerators, but his ef-
10. See supra note 1.
11. In this Article, the authors will refer to these as "put-spouse-through-school"
marriages.
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forts also yield career assets. The marriage may have no signifi-
cant effect on the rate of his accumulation of career assets, or it
may slow down the accumulation of these assets.
12
The woman who works in the home provides services that
the couple would otherwise purchase or do without, but she ac-
cumulates no career assets. In fact, any career assets she does
possess almost certainly depreciate in value over time. South
Carolina divorce settlements, however, now partially recognize
the contributions of a homemaker spouse by attaching economic
value to household duties. Economists testifying in court tradi-
tionally value each hour spent on a household chore or in child
care in one or more of the following ways: Minimum wage, the
cost of hiring someone to do the task, and the hourly wage that
the woman could earn in the labor market (the opportunity cost
approach). 13 If the economist presents more than one method,
the judge can choose the one he prefers or some average of the
estimates presented. None of the three approaches, however,
takes into account the depreciation of career assets incurred by
the woman who remains out of the labor force.
These traditional roles change when the woman works (even
if only temporarily) to support the family while the husband
gains a college or professional education. At first glance, it might
seem that in this situation the woman also would be gaining ca-
reer assets, so that divorce would yield no inequities. Often,
however, this is not so. The wife may postpone her educational
goals to work in a job requiring little skill and with no prospect
of significant advancement in order to devote the family's finan-
cial resources to the husband's education. This slows down her
own accumulation of career assets while accelerating her hus-
12. Cf. Eagerton v. Eagerton, 285 S.C. 279, 282, 328 S.E.2d 912, 914 (Ct. App. 1985)
("[T]he record discloses the wife to have been a spendthrift, a person addicted to exces-
sive medication, who slept until about noon each day and made no meaningful contribu-
tion to either the marriage or the acquisition of property by the husband."). This implies
that the husband's efforts to maintain not only his traditional "role" in the marriage but
the wife's "role," as well, may have impeded the accumulation of career assets.
Of course, it is possible that a marriage may cause the husband to lose transferable
and nontransferable assets. Trouble in a marriage can adversely affect work or school
performance, and borrowing to maintain an inflated lifestyle to please a demanding or
greedy spouse can reduce net equity. Any system purporting to be "fair" must evaluate
all of these factors.
13. For a discussion of the three methods, see Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra
note 3, at 250.53.
760 [Vol. 38
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band's career growth. Her decision to take this course may be
rational if she expects to share in his increased earnings.
The important point is that differing rates of accumulation
of career assets for the husband and wife are likely to occur
when the couple assumes traditional sex roles within the mar-
riage or when one spouse puts the other through school. The
traditional divorce settlement, however, does not even acknowl-
edge the existence of career assets, much less evaluate their
worth for equitable settlement.
Traditionally, alimony has been the law's vehicle for com-
pensating for the sacrifices of those spouses who can earn less. In
Miller v. Miller,14 for instance, the court pointed out that courts
should consider the destruction of income opportunities as a fac-
tor in setting alimony awards.15 Because the law terminates ali-
mony awards upon the divorcee's remarriage, it obviously does
not view alimony as earned and just compensation for the wo-
man's contribution to the marriage and her husband's career,
nor does it recognize the career assets she sacrificed in becoming
a homemaker. Instead, the law views alimony as the husband's
fulfillment of a social obligation not to leave his wife without
some means of support, whether a job or a new husband.16
Over the years, alimony has served to moderate some of the
most serious inequities wrought by the courts' refusal to recog-
nize explicitly the existence and importance of career assets in
14. 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d 119 (1954).
15. Id. at 283, 82 S.E.2d at 123. In South Carolina, factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether alimony should be awarded are as follows:
(1) [T]he financial condition of the husband and the needs of the wife, (2) the
age and health of the parties, their respective earning capacity, their individual
wealth, (3) the wife's contribution to the accumulation of their joint wealth, (4)
the conduct of the parties, (5) the respective necessities of the parties, (6) the
standard of living of the wife at the time of the divorce, (7) the duration of the
marriage, (8) the ability of the husband to pay alimony, and (9) the actual
incomes of the parties.
Lide v. Lide, 277 S.C. 155, 157, 283 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1981).
Weitzman cites United States Census Bureau data which indicate that only 14% of
divorced women are awarded alimony and notes that her studies of California divorces
yield a similar result. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 144. Thus, alimony awards are the
exception rather than the rule in the country as a whole. Although statistical data that
pertains only to South Carolina is not available, there is some evidence that indicates
that alimony is awarded more frequently here than in most states.
16. See Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977); McNaughton v.
McNaughton, 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820 (1972).
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equitable divorce settlements. For this reason, it has been very
important to women, despite the restriction on their freedom to
marry that it entails. If, however, the courts choose to recognize
career assets as marital property, alimony would arguably be
rendered obsolete as unnecessary. 17 In place of alimony and in
addition to the wife's share of marketable assets, courts could
award lump-sum or structured payments to the wife, which
would reflect her equitable share of career assets.
III THE COURTS' RELUCTANCE TO RECOGNIZE CAREER ASSETS
Courts in South Carolina-and in the rest of the na-
tion-have been slow to recognize career assets as marital prop-
erty. Within the last five or six years, however, a trend in that
direction has begun to emerge.18
17. See, e.g., R. CHASTAIN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
VOLUME I 50-51 (S.C. Bar 1986) (pointing out that there is no obvious theoretical justifi-
cation for an award of alimony under the present legal system). Assuming that the theo-
retical justification for alimony is that marriage involves support, adoption of the ideas
espoused here would lead logically to an abolition of permanent alimony in favor of pay-
ments on the property distribution. There probably would be substantial tax conse-
quences to all this.
Of course, some situations may require monthly support or maintenance payments
between the date of separation and the date of execution of the divorce settlement or the
filing of the decree, but no such payments would be required thereafter.
Obviously, the court system could adopt the analytical portion of the proposal dis-
cussed here without the assistance of the legislature, and the courts could make their
determinations on alimony accordingly. Legislative activity, however, would seem more
desirable.
18. The South Carolina Court of Appeals took a significant step toward recognizing
career assets as marital property in Bannen v. Bannen, 286 S.C. 24, 331 S.E.2d 379 (Ct.
App. 1985). It held that "in an action such as this, in which an equitable division is
appropriate but distribution of an interest in a professional association would be con-
trary to law, the court, in lieu of granting the wife an interest in the professional associa-
tion, should consider its value in valuing the marital estate and then make a distributive
award equivalent to the wife's equity in the professional association from other assets of
the marital estate." Id. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 381. But see supra note 7 (discussion of
Helm). The South Carolina courts' disparate treatment of career assets has created a
great deal of uncertainty in this area of the law. If the legal system is to provide predict-
ability in this area, resolution of this issue is necessary.
The problem is not limited to South Carolina. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1986); see also L. WEITZMAN, supra note
4, at 113-39. In O'Brien the Court of Appeals of New York held a medical license to be
"marital property" for purposes of the domestic relations law of that state. 66 N.Y.2d at
584, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The trend is a very gradual one, however,
with inadequate recognition of career assets still the rule rather than the exception.
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Why have the courts not accepted the existence and worth
of career assets as marital property? A review of the court deci-
sions reveals several reasons. First, attorneys who sought to have
career assets classified as marital property generally failed to use
the term "career assets" or the concept of human capital in their
argument. As a result, the courts have looked at goodwill, educa-
tional degrees, professional licenses and practices, and pensions
as conceptually independent and unrelated items incapable of
being classified as a divisible property. 9 If, instead, the court
considered one partner's role in determining the future earning
capacity of the other partner, they might recognize the need to
define marital property to include increases in earning capacities
by either spouse during the marriage and to distribute marketa-
ble assets fairly.20
Second, even when courts have been inclined to recognize
the existence of some career asset, deciding the equitable share
for each partner has been a problem. Courts typically have given
career assets special treatment, rather than including them,
along with tangible assets, as a part of a comprehensive property
settlement. In the same manner, they have separated a spouse's
contribution to career assets from that spouse's other contribu-
tions for purposes of determining shares. This unnecessary and
unjustified distinction between the handling of transferable and
nontransferable assets has muddied the water for the courts.21
19. In Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 171, 345 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1986), the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that a professional degree is a "personal intellectual attain-
ment, not marital property." In Casey v. Casey, 289 S.C. 462, 346 S.E.2d 726 (Ct. App.
1986), cert. granted, 291 S.C. 284, 353 S.E.2d 287 (1987), the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that goodwill of a sole proprietorship may be divisible marital property
under the proper circumstances.
Recognition of career assets as marital property is by no means unanimous among
the states. See Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV.
157, 169 (1978) (noting that "recognition, valuation, and division of 'professional good-
will' as an asset has been more common than recognition of earning capacity").
20. The court in In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), took
precisely this view. It stated, "[I]t is the potential for increase in future earning capacity
made possible by the law degree and certificate of admission conferred upon the husband
with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the asset for distribution by the
court." Id. at 891. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Helm declined to address this
issue because it had not been raised in the trial court. See Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169,
171-72, 345 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1986).
21. The court in Bannen v. Bannen, 286 S.C. 24, 331 S.E.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1985),
viewed the husband's medical practice separately from other assets. It was only because
the wife had contributed directly to the practice as an "unpaid secretary, receptionist,
9
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Third, and perhaps most important, is a reluctance of the
courts to deal with assets whose values are not readily apparent.
Courts have focused on the difficulties associated with assigning
dollar values to nonmarketable career assets. Some refuse to in-
clude any career assets whose values depend upon the survival
and continued work effort of a spouse as marital property be-
cause of their uncertain nature.22 It is hardly equitable, however,
to ignore an asset simply because its value is difficult to compute
or is subject to change. Some courts apparently agree and have
struggled with the valuation of career assets as marital property,
despite the uncertainty and computational complexities.2
Although accountants and attorneys usually have been the
professionals who value marketable marital assets, the courts
and parties should leave the valuation of career assets to econo-
mists. When personal injury or wrongful death cases require the
projection of earnings capacities or change therein, the courts
currently recognize the expertise of economists. These calcula-
tions are precisely those involved in the valuation of career
assets.
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR HANDLING CAREER
ASSETS
Given the facts of a particular domestic case, how should
economists report to the court regarding the equitable division
of marital property? Table 1 below presents the traditional
and bookkeeper for sixteen years" that she was "entitled to a special equity in her hus-
band's interest in the business." Id. at 27, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
Bannen indicates that South Carolina still recognizes the special equity doctrine.
See Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra note 3, at 234-240. This Article does not ad-
dress the question whether the doctrine still performs a genuinely useful function. For
present purposes, the differences between special equity and equitable distribution anal-
yses do not pose any substitute problems in the valuation area.
22. For court decisions that note the speculative nature of career asset valuations
and other valuation difficulties, see, e.g, DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d
761 (Ct. App. 1980), and cases cited in Note, Domestic Relations: Consideration of En-
hanced Earning Capacity of Recently Educated Spouse in Divorce Settlements, 17 SUF-
FOLK U.L. R.v. 901, 905 n.22 (1983), and Comment, Family Law-Reimbursement Ali-
mony, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 1011, 1015 n.25 (1983).
23. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985);
Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Note, Valuation of
Spousal Interest in a Professional Practice for Equitable Distribution: Hirschfeld v.
Hirschfeld, 17 U. RICH L. REv. 387 (1983).
[Vol. 38
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framework used by economists.24 Although the numerical entries
in the table are hypothetical, they are consistent with a tradi-
tional marriage in which the husband is the wage earner and the
wife stays home to perform household duties, child care duties,
or both. The underlying concept of equity is one that views mar-
riage as an economic partnership. Upon dissolution of the mar-
riage, courts should allocate the property of the partnership ac-
cording to the parties' relative contributions towards its
accumulation.
TABLE 125




Direct contributions $0 $100,000
(present value)
Indirect contributions $70,000 10,000
(present value)
Total contributions $70,000 $110,000
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
$70,000/$180,000 = 38.89% $110,000/$180,000 = 61.11%
MARITAL PROPERTY
Total present value of (marketable) assets less liabilities = $50,000
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
38.89% OF $50,000 = $19,445 61.11% OF $50,000 = $30,555
Direct contributions include wages or other earnings by each
party, and indirect contributions comprise the value of house-
hold duties. Courts have included any marketable assets (other
than individual inheritances and assets owned prior to marriage
that a spouse has not comingled with marital assets) in marital
property. Because the courts have refused to recognize career as-
24. Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra note 3, at 255-60.
25. Entries in this table are defined and discussed id. at 248-55.
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sets, as defined herein, as marital property, they ignore those as-
sets in property distributions.
The framework can be expanded, however, to account for
career asset accumulation by the husband and wife."6 Table 2
shows the necessary modifications.2 7 Courts must broaden the
definition of direct contributions and add "career assets accumu-
lated" and "career assets foregone" entries.
TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PURPOSES
OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, CAREER ASSETS INCLUDED
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS
WIFE HUSBAND
,Direct contributions $0 ($100,000-$10,000)= $90,000
(present value)
**Career assets accumulated $0 $80,000
(present value)
Indirect contributions $70,000 $10,000
(present value)
*"Career assets foregone $90,000 $0
(present value)
Total contributions $160,000 $180,000
(present value)
26. For a summary of methods the commentators have proposed to calculate appre-
ciation and depreciation of career assets during marriage, see Beninger & Smith, Career
Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAm. L.Q. 201, 212-
17 (1932). Though some of the methods rely on the sort of analysis presented here, none
of these approaches constitutes a complete and satisfactory method for incorporating
career asset considerations into property settlements in equitable distribution states.
27. The numerical entries in table 2 are from the same hypothetical situation as in
table 1, a traditional male breadwinner, female homemaker marriage.
12
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RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
$160,000/$340,000 = 47.06% $180,000/340,000 = 52.94%
MARITAL PROPERTY
Total present value of marketable assets less liabilities = $50,000
**Total present value of career assets accumulated = $80,000
Total value of marital property = $130,000
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
47.06% OF $130,000 = $61,178 52.94% OF $130,000 = $68,822
* indicates that the definition of an entry differs in table 1.
** indicates an entry not included in table 1.
A comparison of tables 1 and 2 shows that the modifications
to account for career assets can have a substantial impact on the
equitable distribution indicated. The wife, under table 1, would
receive a settlement worth $19,445. Under table 2 her equitable
share rises to $61,178. The husband's settlement decreases from
$110,555 ($30,555 in marketable assets plus his career asset ac-
cumulation of $80,000) to a total award of $68,822. The family
court may not be able to take any of his $80,000 career asset
away from him, but it can require him to make payments to the
wife totaling $11,178 ($80,000-$68,822) in present value. This
would accomplish the settlement indicated by table 2.
A. Direct Contributions Redefined
Because the entries in table 2 can have such a large impact
on the parties, it is important to understand their precise mean-
ing and to know how to calculate their dollar value in any given
case. First, we will discuss the modifications that must be made
to the definition of direct contributions.
Traditionally, direct contributions have included the
spouse's earnings from employment and funds from any other
source made available by the spouse for use by the family. The
authors propose, however, that two changes to this definition are
necessary. First, earnings should include the value of all fringe
13
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benefits received by a spouse during the marriage, even those
paid for by the employer. Fringe benefits are wage substitutes
and should count as contributions by the party earning them.
Second, any expenses a spouse iniurred in producing his or her
direct contributions must be subtracted from them. This in-
cludes the costs of education required to increase a spouse's
earnings. For example, a student's direct contribution to the
marriage consists of his earnings less his direct educational ex-
penses (i.e., tuition and books). This usually will yield a negative
direct contributions figure for the full-time student. A positive
"career asset accumulation" entry, however, would still render
his total contribution positive.
B. Career Assets Accumulated
Unfortunately, the "career assets accumulated" entry under
the contributions and marital property sections of table 2 may
not be so straightforward. This figure should be the present
value of any increase in real earnings capacity28 experienced dur-
ing the marriage, which will be reflected in higher earnings fol-
lowing termination of the marriage.
It is important to stress two points here. First, career assets
owned prior to marriage constitute neither contributions to the
marriage nor marital property. They are rightfully the property
of the party having title to them, as are tangible assets owned
prior to the marriage and kept separate during the marriage.
Second, if a partner sells career assets during the marriage, his
direct contributions reflect their accumulation as higher earnings
and they do not constitute marital assets at the termination of
the marriage. Therefore, to avoid double counting, a court
should count only unspent career assets in the accumulated ca-
reer assets entries.
Career assets may accumulate during marriage for either of
two reasons. First, the simple passage of time during the mar-
riage may allow for the creation of career assets. Satisfactory
participation in the labor force over the marriage years usually
results in the worker's accumulation of career assets. Work expe-
rience itself improves job skills and employer and customer loy-
28. As mentioned earlier, we suggest defining real earnings capacity broadly to in-
clude the value of fringe benefits as part of earnings.
[Vol. 38
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alty and goodwill. These assets, in turn, will result in higher
earnings capacities, which include such wage substitutes as re-
tirement and profit-sharing plans. Similarly, a student spouse
performing satisfactorily in school will accumulate career assets,
such as an education, a professional degree or a license. Second,
certain terms of the marital agreement may enhance a partner's
career asset accumulation. Receiving publicity and generating
controversy in recent years is the situation in which the wife
puts a husband through a professional degree program, thereby
enhancing his earning capacity. He might have been unable to
afford the education without her contribution, or financial con-
straints may have delayed his progress. Of course, she might not
have contributed to his progress, in which case she has not con-
tributed to the accumulation of the asset. That is a matter for
factual proof at a hearing before the family court.
C. Career Assets Foregone
The second new entry in table 2 is "career assets foregone."
This figure should be the present value of any increases in earn-
ings capacity that would have been reflected in higher earnings
after the termination of the marriage had they not been given
up for the sake of marital commitments. Remember that this
concept is not a new one, although this treatment of it is differ-
ent than that undertaken before. 29 The court should account for
foregone career asset accumulation in valuing indirect contribu-
tions during the marriage by using the opportunity cost ap-
proach. In other words, the hourly wage that courts employ to
value a spouse's household and child care duties should increase
to reflect the earnings capacity she would have had if she had
remained in the labor force.
No "career assets foregone" figure appears in-the marital
property section because no career assets exist at the termina-
tion of the marriage if their creation is foregone during the mar-
riage. Career assets may be foregone during marriage in either of
two ways: A partner may continue educational or employment
efforts while accepting lower earnings because of some marital
commitment, or a partner may terminate career efforts com-
29. See generally Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra note 3.
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pletely for the sake of marital commitments.
D. Valuation of Accumulated or Foregone Career Assets
Valuing career assets that a spouse has either accumulated
or foregone during a marriage requires analysis of three "earn-
ings paths."
Path 1
Path 1 is the actual career path a spouse follows. It projects
real earnings (adjusted for inflation) through the end of the indi-
vidual's life expectancy. In calculating real earnings, it is impor-
tant to include fringe benefits which are a substitute for wages
and a part of the worker's salary, and not to subtract payments
by the employee for various benefit programs, Whether voluntary
or mandatory. Since the costs of fringe benefits usually reflect
actuarial statistics, the best approach to valuing these benefits is
to determine their total annual cost. To avoid double counting,
however, do not include employer or employee costs for profit-
sharing or pension plans under direct contributions. Include the
income from such plans instead. If a spouse has not received
that income by the termination of the marriage, the "career as-
sets accumulated" entry will reflect it.5 0
30. South Carolina courts have refused to recognize noncontributory retirement ac-
counts as marital property. See Anderson v. Anderson, 282 S.C. 162, 318 S.E.2d 566
(1984); Haynes v. Haynes, 279 S.C. 162, 303 S.E.2d 429 (1983); Johnson v. Johnson, 288
S.C. 270, 341 S.E.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1986). In Watson v. Watson, 291 S.C. 13, 351 S.E.2d
883 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals noted that certain contributory retirement
plans should be viewed as marital property if an evaluation of the following factors indi-
cated it to be appropriate:
(1) [W]hether the pension plan is mandatory for all employees of the spouse's
employer; (2) whether the spouse has control over the amount of funds placed
in the plan; (3) whether funds in the plan are vested; (4) whether the funds are
readily accessible to the spouse; (5) whether the spouse has control over the
plan's investments; (6) whether the spouse has personally dealt with the plan,
i.e., lent it money or borrowed from it; (7) whether a third party makes inde-
pendent judgments regarding the spouse's dealings with the plan on such mat-
ters as loans from the plan or the use of its property; (8) whether the spouse
uses assets of the plan without adequate compensation for their use; and (9)
whether the plan meets the requirements of a qualified plan under provision
[sic] of the Federal Internal Revenue Code.
Id. at 18-19, 351 S.E.2d at 887. The court in Watson also noted that the new equitable
apportionment statute, S.C. Con ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Supp. 1986), apparently
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In order to include impacts on a spouse's retirement income,
it is important to project his earning capacity not merely
through the end of his worklife expectancy, but through the end
of his life expectancy. If a marriage is very short lived, however,
post-worklife impacts may be insignificant and not worth con-
sidering. For consistency, do not adjust real earnings for per-
sonal income taxes due. Other contributions will be on a before-
tax basis."1
Drawing the actual real earnings path requires only that the
economist have access to the individual's past income data. Rea-
sonable projections of future earnings will be somewhat more
complex. If an individual has remained in the labor force during
the marriage, a past earnings history (supplemented perhaps
with employer evaluations, industry data, and information on
the company profit-sharing and pension plans) should be ade-
quate for the task. Of course, projections will be more tentative
when a spouse, traditionally, the wife, has not worked for some
time. A lapse in time between separation and divorce may aid in
making the projection by allowing the woman an opportunity to
determine her employment options and possibly even to accept
employment. Her acceptance of the best offer would make it
clear what her real earning capacity is at the termination of the
marriage.
In some cases, particularly those involving short-lived mar-
riages, a spouse's best option at the termination of the marriage
will be to return to school. 2 The appropriate method for pro-
jecting future real earnings is the one that uses the highest real-
istic appraisal of total earnings through the end of the wife's life
expectancy. The method assumes that the spouse will take ad-
vantage of her best career options, given her age and capabilities
and other relevant factors. 3
makes all plans, either contributory or noncontributory, distributable as marital
property.
Again, this Article suggests ways to measure the spouse's relative contributions to
the accumulation of divisible marital property. As the initial tables and previous discus-
sion indicate, nothing in the statute that addresses what property is divisible is inconsis-
tent with the concepts set forth here.
31. Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra note 3, at 250.
32. An equitable property settlement that recognizes career assets as marital prop-
erty should provide adequate funding for this in most instances.
33. Weitzman notes the importance of career counseling to the woman who is una-
ware of her career options and who seeks to reenter the labor force. See L. WEITZM2AN,
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Path 2
Path 2 is the career (or real earnings) path that a spouse
would have followed had the marriage never occurred. This
might be called the "single" path. If the circumstances of the
marriage did not alter significantly the partner's career path,
paths 1 and 2 will be the same. If path 1 is above path 2, the
marriage enhanced the partner's career. If path 1 is below path
2, marital obligations or commitments hindered career progress.
Path 3
Path 3 is path 2 without the years of the marriage included.
This path provides a benchmark by showing the career path
that a spouse would have taken had she neither accumulated nor
lost any career assets during the marriage. Stated another way,
path 3 sets the individual's real earnings capacity at the termi-
nation of the marriage equal to that at the inception of the mar-
riage. It then projects growth from that point as if the marriage
had never occurred.
Path 3 assumes that any increase in real wages over time is
a reflection of the buildup by the individual of career assets
(human capital). This projection would not be an exact lagged
copy of the projection in path 2 above if, over time, technology
or market conditions in the individual's field of employment al-
tered the real wage of employees within a given level of educa-
tion, experience, and skill. Increases in real wages over time for a
particular employee may reflect human capital growth, techno-
logical change in the industry, or altered product or labor mar-
ket conditions. If either of the latter changes is significant over
the years of the marriage, one can examine median earnings in
the individual's occupation. Assuming no significant changes in
employment criteria, any increases in median earnings will re-
flect either altered market conditions, technological change, or
both. A proper projection of future earnings would take into ac-
count a rise in median earnings in the individual's field of em-
ployment over the years of the marriage.
Once these three earnings paths are drawn for an individual,
one can determine his or her career asset accumulation, sacrifice,
supra note 4, at 207.
[Vol. 38
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or both by computing the present value of certain gaps between
those paths. The following hypothetical cases present the type of
analysis required for most any marital situations. 4
E. Example Cases
Case 1: The Traditional Marriage-Husband as Breadwinner,
Wife as Homemaker
KEY: = actual real earnings path (path 1)
. - - real earnings path without marriage (path 2)
..... real earnings path, marriage years removed (path 3)
Note: Dotted lines mark critical points in time - the date of marriage, the end of the
marriage, the end of worklife expectancy, and the end of life expectancy.
Figure 1
The Husband
Real [ career asset
Earnings accumulation
Time
Beginning End of End of End of
of Marriage Marriage Worklife Life
Expectancy Expectancy
34. All of the illustrated career paths are linear, but our analysis does not depend on
such an assumption. In fact, earnings paths are more likely to be nonlinear.
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Figure 1 shows that the husband's career is neither en-
hanced nor hindered by the marriage: paths 1 and 2 are identi-
cal. The only impact of the marriage on his accumulation of ca-
reer asset comes through the passage of time. Therefore, one can
describe his buildup of career assets as the present value of the
gap between paths 1 and 3 following termination of the marriage
up through the end of his life expectancy. That part of career
asset accumulation which is reflected in higher earnings during
the marriage is counted in direct contributions and should not
be included here.
KEY: - = actual real earnings path (path 1)
....- real earnings path without marriage (path 2)
..... real earnings path, marriage years removed (path 3)
Note: Dotted lines mark critical points in time - the date of marriage, the end of the
marriage, the end of worklife expectancy, the end of life expectancy.
Figure 2
Real The Wife Foregone career







Beginning End of End of End of
of Marriage Marriage Worklife Life
Expectancy Expectancy
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Figure 2 shows that the wife was pursuing her career up un-
til the marriage and would have continued along path 2 had she
remained single. Upon marriage, she and her husband agreed
that she should terminate her professional pursuits to devote her
time and energy to household duties, childcare duties, or both.
Consequently, her real earnings during marriage drop to zero.
Upon termination of the marriage, she seeks employment in her
former field, but finds that her real wage will be even lower than
it was when she left the labor force.
The gap between paths 2 and 3 from the end of the mar-
riage to the end of her life expectancy shows the buildup of ca-
reer assets she sacrificed by removing herself from the work
force. Her indirect contribution figure should reflect what would
have happened to her earnings during the marriage. This will
occur when the opportunity cost approach to valuing household
duties is used properly.
The gap between paths 1 and 3 shows that she not only
forewent the buildup of her career assets, but she also exper-
ienced an actual depreciation of the career assets which she held
at the time of marriage.
It is apparent from table 2 how the foregone career assets
enter the analysis. But what about the depreciation of the career
assets that she possessed at the time of her marriage? One might
argue that the dollar value of the career assets that she brought
into the marriage should be restored to her from the pool of
marketable assets prior to considering equitable division of the
marital property. When the couple use tangible assets that one
spouse brings to the marriage, the courts generally have not seen
fit to compensate that spouse in full from the pool of marital
assets. 5 Instead, courts simply have included their value as a
contribution to the marriage. Accordingly, they include them in
the relative contribution figures they use to determine the settle-
ment. Hence, consistency requires that the depreciation of ca-
reer assets be ignored in valuing marital property, but included
in the category of "career assets foregone" as a contribution to
35. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 289 S.C. 377, 346 S.E.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1986) (inher-
ited land lost nonmarital character when used for marital home); Domestic Relations,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 37 S.C.L. REV. 126 (1985) (examining the court of
appeals' decision in Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1984), in
which the court held that inherited property is not marital property).
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the marriage.
We can combine the above calculations in the modified
framework (table 2) to summarize the impact of recognizing ca-
reer assets in a traditional marriage. The wife's total contribu-
tions rise when one includes "career assets foregone." The hus-
band's contributions rise when one adds "career assets
accumulated." The relative contributions of the two parties
change. The direction of change for the wife may be positive or
negative depending upon the particular situation. The total size
of marital property increases by the amount of the husband's
career asset accumulation. The value of the wife's equitable set-
tlement is larger.
1. A Special Note About Pension Plans
Since the husband's profit-sharing and pension plans may
have increased in value by sizable amounts during a long-term,
traditional marriage, it is important to note how we account for
them in this framework. First, the husband's contributions in-
clude any buildup of his profit-sharing or pension plans. If the
husband receives income from the buildup of these plans during
the marriage, it becomes part of his direct contribution to the
marriage. The income that he will not receive until after the ter-
mination of the marriage, however, becomes a part of his career
asset accumulation. Second, marital property also includes, as a
part of "career assets accumulated," the present value of any in-
come from the buildup of profit-sharing and pension plans dur-
ing marriage that a spouse will receive after the marriage ends.
Similarly, the traditional wife may have foregone a sizable
buildup of profit-sharing and pension plans. This will be re-
flected in her contributions to the marriage under the career as-
sets foregone entry, assuming that the buildup of such plans
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Case 2: A "Put-Spouse-Through-School" Marriage-Husband
as Student and Future Breadwinner, Wife as Temporary
Breadwinner
KEY: _ = actual real earnings path (path 1)
. - - real earnings path without marriage (path 2)
-..... real earnings path, marriage years removed (path 3)
Note: Dotted lines mark critical points in time - the date of marriage, the end of the
















End of End of
Worklife Life
Beginning End of Expectancy Expectancy
of Marriage Marriage
Figure 3 shows that the husband, a student prior to mar-
riage, continues his education during the marriage and conse-
quently has negative real earnings (zero income and direct edu-
cational expenses) while in school. The marriage ends just as he
completes his education and secures employment. The wife's fi-
nancial contributions to his education have enhanced his earn-
ings capacity. Assuming he could not have afforded professional
school without her financial support, his earnings path would
have been lower for the remainder of his life expectancy (path 2
below path 1). If, however, he could have acquired the same edu-
cation over the same amount of time had he remained single
(i.e., without her help), then there would be no difference be-
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The present value of the gap between paths 2 and 3 demon-
strates the positive impact that the passage of time during the
marriage has on his future earnings. To measure his total
buildup of career assets during the marriage, simply combine the
enhancement and passage-of-time impacts, which is the same as
valuing the gap between paths I and 3.
KEY: - = actual real earnings path (path 1)
....- real earnings path without marriage (path 2)
..... real earnings path, marriage years removed (path 3)
Note: Dotted lines mark critical points in time - the date of marriage, the end of the




= due to termination
of education
Earnings from











Beginning End of Worklif





In figure 4 the wife graduates from college and marries im-
mediately. She postpones or cancels plans for graduate or pro-
fessional school and accepts ,a job to support herself and her
husband while he attends professional school. The marriage ter-
minates just as the husband completes his professional educa-
[Vol. 38
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tion. The wife's best long-term option at that point is to leave
her low-paying job and pursue her plans for graduate or profes-
sional school.
Over her lifetime, the wife's real earnings are lower than
they would have been without the marriage and its commit-
ments (path 1 is below path 2). Although her real earnings ca-
pacity increased during the marriage, it would have grown much
faster had she had remained single. Thus, the present value of
the gap between paths 1 and 2 enters table 2 as a measure of
career assets that she has foregone. Note that table 2 calculates
the present value from the date of the marriage to the end of her
life expectancy. This is done because her foregone earnings are
not accounted for anywhere else. Because she remained em-
ployed through the marriage, her direct and indirect contribu-
tions would reflect only her actual wage.
Paths 1 and 3 will be identical following the termination of
the marriage, which indicates that the marriage years created no
career assets of value in the wife's optimal post-marriage
profession.
We now can combine the calculations in the modified
framework (table 2) to summarize the impact of recognizing ca-
reer assets in a marriage in which one spouse supports the other
spouse-student. Adding the "career assets foregone" entry raises
the wife's contribution entry. The amount of the husband's con-
tribution rises (his direct contributions decrease by the amount
of his direct educational expenses, but his positive career asset
accumulation more than offsets this). The relative contributions
of the two parties change. Again, the direction of change for the
wife may be positive or negative, depending upon the particular
situation. The marital property increases by an amount equal to
the husband's career asset accumulation, and, as a result, the
wife's equitable settlement increases in value.
Case 3: A Childless Modern Marriage
In this example, the marriage affects neither the husband's
nor the wife's real earnings. As a result, figure 1 applies for each.
For the husband, paths 1 and 2 are the same, and the present
value of the gap between paths 1 and 3 enters table 2 as both a
contribution by him and as marital property. The same is true
for the wife.
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If each party contributes to career asset accumulation in the
same proportion as he contributes to marketable asset accumu-
lation, the traditional analysis (table 1) yields the same settle-
ment as table 2. In other words, one may ignore career assets in
this circumstance without producing an inequitable settlement.
Table 3 provides a hypothetical numerical example to illustrate
this. When one adds the parties' respective career asset accumu-
lations to their respective marketable asset awards from the
traditional framework, the figures equal their property settle-
ments under the modified framework. 6
TABLE 3














$77,000/$187,000 = 41.1765% $110,000/187,000 = 58.8235%
Marital Property
Present Value of Marketable Assets = $30,000
Equitable Distribution
41.1765% of $30,000 = $12,352.94 58.8235% of $30,000 = $17,647.06
36. $14,000 + $12,352.94 = $26,352.94, and $20,000 + $17,647.06 = $37,647.06.
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$91,000/$221,000 = 41.1765% $130,000/$221,000 = 58.8235%
Marital Property
Present Value of Marketable Assets = $30,000
Present Value of Career Assets = $34,000
Total value of marital property = $64,000
Equitable Distribution
41.1765% of $64,000 = $26,352.94 58.8235% of $64,000 = $37,647.06
Even in a childless modern marriage, however, it is neces-
sary to consider the partner's career asset accumulations in or-
der to reach an equitable settlement if either party devotes a
greater percentage of his efforts to career asset accumulation
than to marketable asset accumulation. Table 4 demonstrates
this for a hypothetical case in which the wife chooses to work
part-time and be a full-time student and the husband chooses to
work full-time.
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TABLE 4











27.7778% $130,000/$180,000 = 72.2222%
Marital Property
Present Value of Marketable Assets = $30,000
Equitable Distribution















$140,000/$330,000 = 42.4242% $190,000/$330,000 = 57.5758%
Marital Property
Present Value of Marketable Assets = $30,000
Present Value of Career Assets = $160,000
Total Value of Marital Property = $190,000
Equitable Distribution
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Using the traditional analysis of part (a) of table 4, the wife
would receive $8,333.33 in marketable assets plus her $100,000
career asset buildup for a total of $108,333.33. The problem with
this result is that his higher earnings were responsible for all the
accumulation of marketable assets and may have subsidized her
consumption expenditures as well, unless, of course, her con-
sumption expenditures were tiny in relation to his. While she
leaves the marriage with all her career assets and part of the
marketable assets, he gets less than half the assets, but contrib-
uted more than half to the marriage. The recognition of career
assets in part (b) of table 4 corrects this result.
37
V. THE ROLE OF RELATIVE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS ANALYSIS
IN ARRIVING AT AN EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
This Article has demonstrated how the relative economic
contributions analysis applies to the three different types of
marriages discussed above. One can envision countless other
marital circumstances, but the analysis remains the same. Only
the shapes and lengths of the earnings paths will change. Those
changes will reflect the new data in each case.
To establish proof of the three earnings paths, it is impor-
tant to specify the data one uses to chart them. That data in-
cludes the date of marriage; the date of divorce; age and remain-
ing worklife expectancy, which includes any modifications that
are appropriate in view of this spouse's health considerations;
life expectancy, which also includes any appropriate health con-
siderations; educational level; dates and terms of previous em-
ployment; previous earnings; and future employment and earn-
ings prospects, with consideration given to the spouse's health,
education, age, and capabilities. If the relative contributions
framework recognizes career assets, it incorporates into its mea-
surement of contributions more than half of the specific factors
37. Actually, the validity of this claim depends upon a public policy determination
of what is an "equitable" settlement. South Carolina law contains no explicit definition
of this term. For present purposes the authors will assume that an equitable settlement
is one in which each spouse shares in the marital assets according to his relative contri-
bution to their accumulation. Obviously, the parties and the court must also consider
other factors, such as fault, custody, and child support. This approach deals only with
measuring contributions, with fair consideration given to all kinds of determinable
contributions.
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that the court must consider under South Carolina's equitable
apportionment legislation.
One does not consider fault, nonmarital property, child cus-
tody arrangements and their impact on treatment of the family
home, and the existing support obligations of either spouse
within this framework. The relative economic contributions
framework indicates the property settlement due to each spouse
in view of his relative contribution to the accumulation of prop-
erty by the marital partnership. It is not intended as a final set-
tlement prescription. Courts should recognize noneconomic con-
siderations such as fault and child custody in modifying the
settlement prescribed within the relative contributions
framework.
VI. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT
In some cases, including career assets as property will re-
quire the court to establish provisions for one partner to receive
compensation from the other in the future. The spouse with a
large accumulation of career assets may not have adequate mar-
ketable assets to provide lump-sum compensation to the spouse
who lacks significant career assets at divorce.-8 In this instance,
the court may establish a future payment schedule to equal, in
present value, the amount due the partner. Alternatively, the
courts may use income projections to arrive at an award calcu-
lated as a percentage of future annual earnings. The latter ap-
proach is appealing because payments to the partner reflect un-
anticipated income fluctuations. Because such a settlement
provides an incentive to conceal income it probably is not
advisable.
Requiring one spouse to make monthly payments to the
other as a part of an equitable property settlement is preferable
to awarding alimony in at least two very important ways.39 First,
a property settlement, even if it calls for monthly payments,
does not constitute a restraint on the freedom of the spouse re-
38. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 54-61 (providing data which indicate that
such assets are limited in the typical divorce case).
39. The argument that truly equitable property settlements should replace alimony
in part or in full is not new. See, e.g., Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital
Property in Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 559-60 (1983).
[Vol. 38
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ceiving the funds to remarry. A property settlement, unlike ali-
mony, recognizes that the spouse receiving the payments de-
serves them for her contributions to the marriage and that they
should not be contingent upon marital status.40
Second, a property settlement, unlike alimony payments, is
final and not subject to revision in the future if the economic
circumstances of either party change. Alimony makes the finan-
cial position of the spouse who receives it dependent upon fac-
tors beyond her control, such as her spouse's decisions regarding
remarriage and more children. A property settlement requires
the spouse making payments to fulfill that obligation whether or
not he chooses to assume new obligations.
Third, depending, to an extent, upon the will of the parties,
a property rights settlement will not be taxable to the payee nor
deductible to the payor.41
A. A Word About Alimony
The authors have noted already that proper equitable dis-
tribution awards should obviate the need for alimony.4 We be-
40. Reiss v. Reiss, 195 N.J. Super. 150, 478 A.2d 441 (1984), is noteworthy because
in that case the court compensated the wife for her contribution by awarding her "reim-
bursement alimony" rather than conventional alimony. In so doing, the court noted that
conventional alimony was not appropriate because "it 'would force [the spouse] to forego
marriage and perhaps even be celibate for many years simply to realize a return on her
investment and sacrifices."' Id. at 158, 478 A.2d at 444 (quoting Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1979)). Therefore, the court awarded "reimbursement alimony"
to avoid the contingencies of conventional alimony. In effect, "reimbursement alimony"
is not distinguishable from a property settlement that requires structured payments in
the future.
41. There may be tax advantages to both parties in having a property division
treated as an alimony payment because this approach shifts the burden of paying federal
income taxes on that money from the alimony payor to the recipient. If the payor is in a
higher tax bracket than the recipient, the couple will have more after-tax dollars to di-
vide between them than they would have if the monies were deductible at the lower rate
of the recipient. For the arrangement to be beneficial to the recipient, the parties, of
course, would have to share these tax savings. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1), (2), (c)(1), (2) (West
Spec. Pamphlet 1987). Note that a true property division treatment of these matters
would require an adjustment to the capital asset accumulation figure (appearing under
the contributions category) to account for income taxes due. The testifying expert should
be able to take this into account since it would only require him to subtract the income
taxes due from each of the three earnings streams that he would use in computing that
accumulation. Note also that the adjustment should have only a small impact on the
capital asset accumulation figure, unless the gap between the earnings streams is large.
42. See supra note 41.
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lieve this result to be desirable. Alimony is an outmoded welfare
concept that assumes that men are socially responsible for their
wives because women are, by nature or by some other dictate,
incapable of self-support. A spouse's inability to support herself,
however, has little to do with being female, and, instead, has
more to do with the different roles the parties played during the
marriage. Men in the same situations would also find it difficult
to support themselves. Courts should only require the divorced
spouse, whether male or female, to be responsible for adequate
child support, and an equitable property settlement, which fully
recognizes and includes career assets as property. Anything be-
yond that constitutes a disproportionate social welfare tax on
the divorced men and women who pay alimony. Of course, until
the courts apply an approach such as the one suggested here,
some spouses, particularly those who have been in long-term
traditional marriages, will need alimony.
The precise composition of the assets that a court should
award to each party is an issue that this Article does not ad-
dress. Assuming a court properly values the marital property,
the two partners should be concerned primarily with the dollar
value of the assets received rather than their identity. Barring
emotional attachment to certain assets, there should be strong
feelings about who gets which assets only when the sale of an
asset or the purchase of a similar involve high transaction costs.
The sale or purchase of tangible property and business interests
often involve these transaction costs and this fact should influ-
ence the distribution of marketable assets in the settlement.
This Article does not address the issues associated with the
proper distribution of marital property upon divorce. Instead,
this Article is only concerned with how to decide the total dollar
value of marital property that should go to each party.
43
VII. CONCLUSION
Failure to acknowledge career assets as marital property
43. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 78-96, suggests that who gets the house is a par-
ticularly important issue for the psychological well being of the wife and children. Courts
in South Carolina have recognized specifically the significance of this issue. See R. CHAS-
TAIN, supra note 17, at 82; see also id. at 52-54 (Temp. Supp. 1986). Overall, the supreme
court has made it clear that any equitable mechanism may be used to decide the alloca-
tion of marital property. See, e.g., Bowyer v. Sohn, 290 S.C. 249, 349 S.E.2d 403 (1986).
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when deciding what constitutes an equitable apportionment of
that property penalizes spouses who have devoted most of their
time to family duties instead of developing marketable skills.
South Carolina courts, at least in part, have compensated for
this inequity by awarding alimony to those spouses. The atti-
tude that alimony is a social obligation of spouses able to pay
rather than a part of an equitable property settlement, which is
reflected by the contingencies courts place on alimony awards,
makes alimony a poor substitute for a truly equitable property
settlement.
If the courts recognize the value of career assets accumu-
lated during marriage as marital property and correctly value
that property, alimony payments following divorce will be
neither necessary nor appropriate. Correct valuation of career
assets accumulated is not simple. It requires that both spouses
provide the court with earnings and educational histories over
the course of the marriage; it requires some "speculation" re-
garding future earnings prospects;"' and the necessary computa-
tions are time consuming. Courts, however, routinely admit such
valuations into evidence in other kinds of cases, notably, per-
sonal injury cases. They are equally essential in divorce cases,
particularly those involving long-term, traditional sex role mar-
riages or those in which the wife has supported a student-hus-
band. Valuation difficulties are a poor excuse for the inequities
that result when courts ignore career asset accumulations in dis-
tributing marital property upon divorce.
Further, recognition of career asset accumulations during
marriage does not make it necessary for the court to value or
divide professional degrees, licenses, practices, or goodwill. Since
future earnings projections will reflect these assets, courts
should not value them individually. Courts should consider the
44. This does not require any more "speculation" than that required under the re-
cent "rehabilitative alimony" decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals. For example, in Canady v. Canady, 289 S.C. 512, 347 S.E.2d 115 (Ct. App.
1986), the court of appeals wrote that "[a]n award of rehabilitative alimony must be
based on facts which ... demonstrate the recipient's self-sufficiency at the expiration
date of the ordered payments." Id. at 515-516, 347 S.E.2d at 117 (emphasis added). The
Canady court essentially echoed the South Carolina Supreme Court in Herring v. Her-
ring, 286 S.C. 447, 335 S.E.2d 366 (1985), in which the court stated that "the record must
demonstrate the self-sufficiency of the recipient at the expiration date of ordered pay-
ments." Id. at 451, 335 S.E.2d at 368 (emphasis added).
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overall impact of the marital years on earnings capacity as a part
of marital property. As long as courts define earnings broadly to
include income from various fringe benefit programs, the prob-
lem of how to handle career assets is reduced to recognizing the
impact of a period of marriage on the future earnings capacities
of the two parties within the relative economic contributions
framework described above.
Until the law in South Carolina and in other states fully
accounts for career assets in property settlements, women who
wish to be homemakers should be aware that courts in divorce
actions do not yet reward the decision to forego career opportu-
nities. Upon divorce, a woman (or a man) who makes this deci-
sion usually will find herself, at best, reliant upon alimony, with
its associated uncertainties and restrictions. At worst, she will
have a significantly reduced standard of living because of her
impaired earnings capacity for which present equitable distribu-
tion approaches do not adequately compensate.45 The authors
believe that the approaches to equitable distribution of marital
property suggested herein could help remedy the inadequacies of
the present approach and lend greater predictability and respec-
tiblity to the legal system in this area.
45. Those analyzing property settlements under no-fault laws in states such as Cali-
fornia make this same argument, perhaps even more strongly. See L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 4, at 372; Beninger & Smith, supra note 26, at 216-17.
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